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Abstract 
 
The Mississippi Bubble and the South Sea Bubble are the two most famous and 
earliest episodes in the history of speculation, which can be dated back to the 
eighteenth century. Unlike most studies focus on some recent financial bubble 
footprints, we pay special attention to the most remarkable events in 1720. We 
empirically test for evidence of exuberance in historical stock prices of the 
Mississippi Company and the South Sea Company during the well-documented 
Mississippi Bubble and South Sea Bubble episodes, respectively. The right-tailed 
unit root test of Phillips, Shi and Yu (2015, PSY) is utilised in this paper. In 
addition, contagion in these historical markets is also considered. 
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1. Introduction
Financial history reports the presence of bubbles in a range of commodity markets, for example,
Tulipmania during 1634-1637, the Stock Market Crash of 1929, Japan’s Lost Decade in the 1980s and
the 1990s NASDAQ bubble. Ahamed (2009) and Brunnermeier & Schnabel (2016) provide a review of
different financial bubbles/crises since the 17th century. Among many historical bubble episodes, the5
Tulipmania, the Mississippi Bubble and the South Sea Bubble are the three most famous and earliest
example of financial bubbles. In particular, the Mississippi Bubble, the South Sea Bubble and similar
bubbles in Holland and Germany between 1719 and 1720 are parts of the first international stock
market speculative boom and bust in capitalist Europe (Neal, 1990). The main aim of this study is to
investigate explosive behaviour in Mississippi and South Sea share prices during the well-documented10
Mississippi Bubble and South Sea Bubble episodes using the recent right-tailed unit root test of Phillips,
Shi & Yu (2015, PSY). In this paper, we use ‘exuberance’ to describe explosive behaviour in stock
prices. We also consider whether the British stock markets in 1720 are exuberant by investigating
South Sea episode spillovers to other British share prices in 1720.
A simple definition of a bubble is a deviation of the market price from the asset’s fundamental15
value, see Stiglitz (1990). The PSY approach is often applied to a price-fundamental ratio to assess
the explosive behaviour. As we assess evidence of explosive behaviour in a price series without its
fundamental, we conclude a finding of explosive behaviour in a price series as ‘exuberance’. The
‘exuberance’ is part of the most famous quotes given by the Federal Reserve Board chairman, Alan
Greenspan. Irrational exuberance is a phrase introduced by Alan Greenspan during a speech in 199620
to describe the significant surge in the stock market of the 1990s. This phrase is also used by Robert
Shiller as the title of his book. Irrational exuberance is used for describing over-confident stock investors
that bid stock prices up to unusually high and unsustainable levels. Shiller (2005) interprets irrational
exuberance as the psychological basis of a speculative bubble. According to Shiller (2005), the famous
Greenspan’s speech in 1996 was given at the beginning of the most speculative growth in the US stock25
market history. The Dow Jones Industrial Average was 3600 at the beginning of 1994. It reached
10000 in March 1999 and peaked at 11722 in early 2000. Many people are puzzled over the most
remarkable rise in the stock market. The irrational exuberance phrase becomes popular and has been
referred to many times nowadays. We, therefore, use ‘exuberance’ to describe the speculation in the
stock market.30
Both the speculation of the Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles behave in a similar way. In par-
ticular, the speculation of these historical events involved a company that expanded its balance sheet
through corporate takeovers or acquisition of government debt, financed by successive issues of shares
2
(Garber, 1990). The motivation of both the Mississippi and the South Sea schemes is to refinance
the national debts accumulated during the War of the Spanish Succession (see Hamilton (1947) and35
Dickson (1967)).
The following historical background of the Mississippi Bubble episode is obtained from Murphy
(1997) and Garber (1990). Mississippi bubble is an economic bubble that resulted from John Law’s
‘system’. Law developed and adopted a ‘system’ to take over the French national debt accumulated
by the wars of Louis XIV using equity. Law initially submitted a proposal for establishing a public40
bank but it was rejected. Despite the slowdown in the French economy and a shortage of money, Law
was permitted to establish a private note-issuing bank-the Banque Generale in June 1716. Law then
started the Company of the West (Company d’Occident) and acquired the monopoly on trade with
French colonies in Louisiana. French Louisiana in 1717 included the current states of Arkansas, Illinois,
Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri and Wisconsin. According to (Murphy, 1997, p.167),45
there are two objectives for establishing the Company d’Occident-one is debt management and the
other is colonial trade. The Company d’Occident gained tobacco monopoly and right to trade with
Africa by acquiring the Senegalese Company in September 1718 and November 1718, respectively.
In January 1719, Law’s Banque Generale was renamed as the Banque Royal and was taken over
by the Crown. However, Law remained in control of the Banque Royal. Law went on a series of50
acquisitions. For example, Law acquired the East India Company and the China Company in May
1719 as these two companies were in trouble. The Company of African was also taken over in June
1719. Law then renamed his entire business (the Company d’Occident with other acquired companies)
as the Compagnie des Indes, which was more commonly known as the Mississippi Company. Through
the acquisition, the Company effectively dominated all French trade outside Europe. The Company55
purchased the right to mint new coinage in July 1719. The Company bought the right to collect all
French indirect and direct taxes in August 1719 and October 1719. Law was able to refund most of
the French debt through his company. Several share issues during 1719 were carried out to acquire
the debt.
Law was appointed as France’s Controller General in January 1720, who controlled all government60
finance and expenditure and the money creation of the Banque Royale. He then proposed to prohibit
to use specie in payments. Banque Royale’s notes were made legal tender in February 1720. On 5
March 1720, the share price was fixed at 9000 livres and shares can be converted to banknotes or vice
verse at this fixed price. Law was monetizing the shares of the Mississippi Company. However, Law
realised that he had fixed the prices too high and he proposed a deflation in the price of shares and65
banknotes on 21 May 1720. The reductions would reduce the price from 9000 livres to 5000 livres in
3
several steps between May 1720 and December 1720. The share price dropped significantly after the
price deflation plan.
Similar to the Mississippi episode, the South Sea Bubble involved a company (the South Sea
Company) that acquired some outstanding British government debt in 1720. However, the South Sea70
Company was not involved in takeovers of commercial companies. According to Garber (1990), the
British debt in 1720 worth approximately 50 million and 18.3 million of the debt was held by three
largest companies: Bank of England (3.4 million), East India Company (3.2 million) and South Sea
Company (11.7 million). These three companies involved in the government debt financing. The
following background of the South Sea Bubble is obtained from Scott (1912) and Garber (1990).75
The South Sea Company was firstly founded in 1711. In 1720, the South Sea Company had
monopoly rights on British trade with the Spanish colonies of South America. The most important
event during early 1720 was that Parliament passed the South Sea Bill on 21 of March. The South
Sea Company won the competitive bidding against the Bank of England to obtain the privilege of
converting the government debt. The South Sea Company needed to pay the government 7.5 million80
pounds (including approximately 1.3 million bribes to members of Parliament) to acquire the 31 million
of privately held government debt. In order to finance the debt acquisition, the South Sea Company
was allowed to expand its shares. The higher price of South Sea Company stock, the more attractive
for debt holders to exchange existing government debt for South Sea Company stock (Carlos & Neal,
2006). Hence, there is an incentive for the Company to concentrate on the market value of the stock.85
Instead of issuing all the stock at once, the Company offered four subscriptions for cash between April
and August in 1720. For each subscription, the share price was issued at higher and higher prices.
In addition, the company offered two bond subscriptions. The Company accumulated 80% of the
irredeemables and 85% of the redeemables in public hands after the debt conversions (Garber, 1990).
Following the speculation of the South Sea Company, some other joint-stock companies had been90
created. These newly created companies are known as “bubbles companies”. These newly created
companies looked very attractive to investors and speculators, which carved up some potential South
Sea profits. As a result, Parliament passed the Bubble Act in 1720 to stop companies without Royal
charter to exist, which was promoted by the South Sea Company. When the Bubble Act was enforced
on August 1720, downward pressure was placed on all shares including the South Sea Company. The95
share price collapsed in September 1720. The market value of all the South Sea shares on 31 August
was 164 million pounds. However, 103 million of these shares were lost in September.
The three monied companies - the South Sea Company, the Bank of England, and the East India
Company played a major role in the South Sea Bubble as they engaged in the debt-for-equity swap.
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The Bank of England is founded in 1694. The Bank was the first permanent stock and the longest-lived100
security in London Stock Exchange (Neal, 1990). According to Carlos et al. (2006), Bank of England
shares were one of few publicly available securities, and shares are reorganised as a stable asset as
they are the least speculative during 1720. The original East India Company was founded in 1600
with a royal charter, and it became a permanent joint-stock 1657. The new East India Company was
established in 1698. The old and new companies were emerged by 1709. We consider those British105
companies that do not involve debt-equity swap as well (e.g., London Assurance, Million Bank, Royal
African Company and Royal Exchange Assurance). The Million Bank is founded in 1695 which held
a large number of securities. A review of the Million Bank is provided by Scott (1911). The share
price of Million Bank is higher than that of the Bank of England in most cases. Hence, the share price
of Million Bank looks more promising and attractive compared with that of the Bank of England.110
The Royal African Company received a Royal charter in 1672 and then became the second largest of
the joint-stock companies after the East India Company (Carlos et al., 2002). The company has the
monopoly of English trade in Africa and engages in the slave trade, but it does not involve in the
financing of national debt. In 1720, the company issued stock that rose quickly in value. One of the
innovations in 1720 is the establishment of marine insurance companies-Royal Exchange Assurance and115
London Assurance. The early growth of British insurance industry is completed by the establishment
of two insurance companies in 1720 along with their powers to include fire and life insurance in 1721
(Supple, 1970). Both insurance companies founded in 1720 are a major innovation in sharing-risk for
foreign trade. The creation of the Royal Exchange Assurance is important not only in the development
of insurance in the British history but also the share market in Britain. Such a company is needed120
to provide a better and secure service for the marine trade. The growth of the London insurance
market is associated with the marked expansion of English foreign trade during the second half of the
seventeenth century; and forms part of that remarkable period of financial activity culminating in the
South Sea Bubble (John, 1958). Marine insurance played a vital role in facilitating the expansion of
trade during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Kingston, 2007).125
Many studies in the literature attempt to explain how bubble-like behaviour in stock prices is linked
with technological innovation. According to the Economist, “every previous technological revolution
has created a speculative bubble, and there is no reason why IT should be different”(21 September
2000). Recent studies focus on examining how technological innovation changes could affect stock prices
and potentially lead to stock price bubbles. Especially, the arrival of new technology is contributed to130
the most famous 1920s and 1990s stock market run-ups in the US (see, Hall (2001), Shiller (2005)).
Hobijn & Jovanovic (1999) and Hobijn & Jovanovic (2001) argue that major technological revolutions
often lead to a fall in stock prices as the incumbent firms cannot adopt the new technology and new
5
firms enter the market with a time lag. A similar conclusion is drawn by Laitner & Stolyarov (2003),
who argues that new technology causes the stock price to drop by obsoleting old capitals. Shiller135
(2005) looks at the S&P 500 price-earnings ratio during the period 1871-2005 that involves a lot of
technological innovations in the American history. The ratio shows several historical peaks which are
likely caused by the invention of new technology. For example, the peak in 1901 is likely driven by
the first transatlantic radio transmission and prospects for high-tech. The recent boom in 2000 (as
known as the dot-com bubble) is driven by telecommunication industry and is another example for140
innovation-driven bubbles. The peak in the 1920s can also be explained by innovation changes as well.
According to DeMarzo et al. (2007), the bubble of the 1920s is mainly driven by some new technology
stocks (e.g., the automobile, aircraft, motion picture, and radio industries)1. DeMarzo et al. (2007)
use their model to explain that overinvestment increases the risk of the technology which could lead
to bubbles as investors frequently ignore the potential risks of the new technology by over-investing.145
They observe that bubble-like behaviour in stock prices are always associated with innovative firms
adopting a new technology. For instance, both the Mississippi Company and the South Sea Company
are examples of firms adopting a technological innovation as both companies were granted the monopoly
power of foreign trading. The British railway mania in the 1840s is another great example. Therefore
stock price bubbles can be driven by major technological innovations, and these examples support the150
hypothesis of innovation-driven bubbles. Wang (2007) provides a new explanation for the dot-com
bubble as equilibrium industry dynamics driven by new and existing technologies. New firms will
enter the market by adopting the new technology and some incumbent firms succeed in adopting the
new technology innovation because of existing technology and assets. However, some new firms will
be forced out as more incumbent firms get used to adopting the innovation. Nicholas (2008) argues155
that the development of technological innovation during the 1920s is a key driver of the US stock
market run-up. Pa´stor & Veronesi (2009) summary that technological innovations are often associated
with bubble-like behaviour in stock prices of those innovative firms. Stock prices for those innovative
firms tend to rise initially due to high prospects, but prices fall due to the risks associated with new
technology changes. They explain that both high uncertainty and quick adoption during the revolution160
promote bubbles. A recent paper by Fostel & Geanakoplos (2012) shows that the financial innovation
results in the mortgage boom and bust and the crisis of 2007-2009.
The above studies seem to suggest that technological innovation plays a major role in promoting
bubbles. The natural question is to consider whether technological innovations cause the Mississippi
Bubble and South Sea Bubble. According to Frehen et al. (2013), there are four important innova-165
1The US 1920s stock market is overvalued by 30 percent (De Long & Shleifer, 1991).
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tions in 1720, three of which are financial innovations and the rest is a shift in global trade. A major
innovation in 1720 is government finance as both the Mississippi Company and the South Sea Com-
pany adopt a new financial innovation approach of exchanging equity shares for national debt. The
second innovation is a shift in global trade as both companies are granted monopoly power of foreign
trade. Maritime insurance provided by Royal Exchange Assurance and London Assurance Company170
for sharing-risk is the third technological innovation. The four innovation involves the British corpo-
rations to seek opportunities beyond their charter. These four innovations suggested by Frehen et al.
(2013) help us to understand the causes of the first international stock market bubble, which is one of
the most extraordinary historical events.
Several studies have tested the Mississippi Bubble or the South Sea Bubble as these episodes have175
generated considerable interest in the literature. Neal (1990) carries out the statistical analysis using
the method of Blanchard & Watson (1982) and concludes that the Mississippi share price contains a
rational bubble from mid-July 1719 to the end of November 1719 and the South Sea share price contains
a rational bubble between 23 February 1720 and 15 June 1720 only. Carlos et al. (2002) examine the
Royal African Company share prices during the South Sea episode and find no significant evidence180
to support the existence of a bubble. They call into question the arguments by Chancellor (1999)
that the South Sea Bubble was the result of mania and speculative excesses. However, Garber (2001)
claims that he provides market fundamental explanations for the three most famous bubbles: the
Tulipmania, the Mississippi Bubble and the South Sea Bubble, which seems to provide no evidence
of bubbles for these historical episodes. Velde (2009) concludes that the Mississippi Company is185
overvalued. The famous South Sea Bubble has attracted a lot of academic attentions, especially why
the bubble grows significantly. Dale (2004) argues that apparent mispricing of subscription receipts
prove investor irrationality. Temin & Voth (2004) examined an investor in the South Sea Bubble - the
Hoare’s Bank, a fledgeling West End London bank. They argue that the bank was aware that South
Sea shares were overvalued but still invested in South Sea shares. The bank invested rationally and190
found it was profitable to “ride” the bubble before the bubble burst in 1720.
Most existing studies focus on examining some recent financial bubble episodes using a relatively
short price series. Only do few studies investigate the presence of bubbles/exuberance using a his-
torically long series. For example, Phillips, Shi & Yu (2015) provide evidence of bubbles in the US
S&P stock market using a 150-year data. A recent study by Hu & Oxley (2016) presents some results195
using long run house price data (at least 190 years data) for Amsterdam, Norway and Paris. Instead,
in this paper, we attempt to examine the evidence of exuberance during one of the earliest bubbles
in financial history. Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we empirically
investigate evidence of exuberance in Mississippi and South Sea share prices during the eighteenth
7
century. This is perhaps the earliest empirical study that we can formally test for explosive behaviour200
in historical stock prices.2. Second, we also look for empirical evidence in other six British share prices
during the South Sea Bubble episode (e.g., Bank of England, London Assurance, Million Bank, East
India Company, Royal African Company and Royal Exchange Assurance). In particular, we explore
evidence of exuberance in a different perspective by focusing on four companies that do not involve
the government debt for equity swap (e.g., London Assurance, Million Bank, Royal African Company205
and Royal Exchange Assurance). These four companies are more representative of the general ground
market. It is of great interest to look for speculative behaviour in British share market, and we essen-
tially investigate whether the famous South Sea episode spillovers into other British company share
prices in 1720. Unlike the Mississippi Company, even if the South Sea episode is purely related to the
South Sea Company, there is a broad-based rise for other shares in the British market.210
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and Section 3 gives a brief descrip-
tion of the PSY of Phillips, Shi & Yu (2015). Section 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5
concludes.
2. Data
The daily share price indices used in this paper are obtained from Frehen et al. (2013)3 and are215
shown in Figure 1 between 1719 and 1720 on a Julian calendar. The daily share price for the Mississippi
Company between 2 July 1719 and 14 November 1720 (N=385) is displayed in Figure 1a, where N is
number of observation. The Mississippi share price rose from 2000 livres in July 1719 to more than
10000 livres at the end of 1719. However, the Mississippi price declined to less than 4000 livres in
November 1720. The daily share price for the South Sea Company between 10 August 1719 and 23220
November 1720 (N=393) is shown in Figure 1b. The South Sea share price was about 130 pounds at
the start of 1720, and it reached the peak in June/ July at almost 1000 pounds. When the bubble
collapsed in October, the price dropped to 200 pounds. Many investors and potential investors are
convinced by the fact that the price would keep rising at that time (Hoppit, 2002). Figure 1c shows
the time series plot of the share price per pound for Bank of England (N=393), London Assurance225
(N=307), Million Bank (N=348), East India Company (N=417), Royal African Company (N=418) and
Royal Exchange Assurance (N=294). All share prices are transformed into logarithm before analysis.
Figure 1b and Figure 1c show that the British share prices in 1720 are characterised by a spectacular
rise and fall in value, occasioned by the South Sea Bubble.
2Garber (2001) provides some tulip price data but it is too short to apply the PSY.
3Several sources are used for constructing the share price index including the Leydse Courant, Neal (1990), Murphy
(1997), Velde (2003), see Frehen et al. (2013) for details.
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Figure 1: The time series plot of the daily stock price index (Julian dates) for the Mississippi Company, South Sea
Company, Bank of England, London Assurance, Million Bank, East India Company, Royal African Company and Royal
Exchange Assurance.
3. Method230
We apply the right-tailed unit root test of Phillips, Shi & Yu (2015) to examine evidence of explosive
behaviour in historical stock prices. The martingale null with an asymptotically drift is specified as:
H0 : yt = dT
−η + yt−1 + εt, εt ∼ NID(0, σ2), (1)
where d is a constant, T is the sample size and η is a localizing coefficient. The alternative hypothesis
is a mildly explosive process:
H1 : yt = δT yt−1 + εt, (2)
9
where δt = 1 + cT
−θ with c > 0 and θ ∈ (0, 1).
The following regression model is estimated:
∆yt = α+ βyt−1 +
K∑
i=1
γi∆yt−j + εt, (3)
where α is an intercept.
The generalized sup ADF (GSADF) test relies on repeated estimation of the ADF test rescissions
of Equation (3) on subsamples of the data in a recursive fashion. The window size rw expands from r0
to 1, where r0 is the minimum window size. The ending point r2 varies from r0 to 1 and the starting
point r1 varies from 0 to r2 − r0. The GSADF statistic is the largest ADF statistic over range of r1
and r2 and is defined as:
GSADF (r0) = sup
r2∈[r0,1]
r1∈[0,r2−r0]
ADF r2r1
The backward SADF (BSADF) statistic is defined as the sup value of the ADF statistic sequence:
BSADFr2(r0) = sup
r1∈[0,r2−r0]
ADF r2r1
The BSADF statistic and its corresponding critical value are used for dating the origination and
termination dates of a bubble. The minimum window size r0 is equal to 0.01 + 1.8/
√
T . A fixed lag
order of 0 is also selected. The finite sample critical values are obtained from Monte Carlo simulations235
with 2,000 replications.
The PSY approach is often applied to a price-fundamental ratio to assess explosive behaviour where
the rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root implies explosive behavior for yt. If the time series
yt involves an economic fundamental, we conclude that a finding of explosive behavior denotes the
presence of a bubble. Alternatively, if the time series yt doesn’t involve an economic fundamental, we240
may only conclude that a finding of explosive behavior is evidence of exuberance, and such an episode
is described as an exuberant episode, see Hu & Oxley (2016).
Most studies have followed Phillips et al.’s (2014) suggestion to include an intercept in the regression
model for right-tailed unit root tests. Hu & Oxley (2016), however, show how many empirical papers
which follow this suggestion have reported rejections of the null suggesting periods of rapid increase in245
for example, prices associated with a growing ‘bubble’ or an ‘exuberant episode’, when in fact the data
identifies a ‘collapse’ or a ‘collapse and recovery’ phase and not a bubble or an exuberant episode, see
Figure 2. Visual inspection can usually resolve these cases, although it also seems that false (positive)
10
bubbles also seem to be reported when an intercept is included. Chong & Hurn (2016) also show
that the regression model specification without an intercept is preferred. Here we use two different250
specifications for the regression model, one with an intercept and one without, to explore evidence of
explosive behaviour and compare the results obtained from both formulations.
(a) Collapse episode
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Figure 2: Examples of collapse episode, collapse and recovery episode and exuberant episode/bubble.
4. Results
4.1. Mississippi share prices
We present the date-stamping outcomes for Mississippi share prices in Figure 3 under two model255
specifications. Under the assumption with an intercept, the GSADF test statistic suggests strong
evidence of explosive behaviour at the 1% level, where the test statistic is much greater than the
critical value (10.5665>2.7015). The corresponding date-stamping outcomes in Figure 3a seem to
provide some evidence where the test statistic (blue line) exceeds the critical value sequences (red line)
in May 1720. However, we could not interpret such results as evidence of explosive behaviour in share260
prices due to the fact that the explosive behaviour in share prices is caused by a ‘collapse and recovery
episode’ in May 1720, which is clearly shown in Figure 3a.
It would be interesting to compare test results obtain from the regression specification without an
intercept with those under the assumption with an intercept. As shown in Figure 3b, we obtain quite
different results when the intercept term is excluded in the model specification. The null hypothesis265
of no explosive behaviour is strongly rejected at the 1% level as the test statistic is greater than the
11
critical value (4.4062>4.1552). We identify an exuberant episode between September 1719 and May
1720, which coincides with the traditional view of the Mississippi episode period. Hence this finding
provides evidence of exuberance in share prices to support the well-known Mississippi episode during
1719-1720. Overall, our results provide evidence of an exuberant episode only under the assumption270
without an intercept. This result is still of great importance as this is the first empirical study to
provide evidence of exuberance during the Mississippi episode by formally testing Mississippi stock
prices using the PSY. However, it also acts as an additional warning about naive interpretation of the
PSY test.
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Figure 3: Date-stamping strategy of Mississippi share prices between July 1719 and November 1720 (Julian dates) based
on different model formulations.
4.2. South Sea share prices275
The date-stamping outcomes for South Sea share prices are presented in Figure 4 under two different
regression model specifications. As shown in Figure 4a and Figure 4b, we find significant evidence of
exuberance in South Sea share prices under the assumption with/without an intercept. When the
intercept is included, the null hypothesis of no explosive behaviour in share prices is rejected at the
1% level (7.5447>2.7313). From Figure 4a, we find an exuberant episode between February 1720 and280
mid-August 1720. When the intercept is excluded, the null hypothesis of no explosive behaviour in
share prices is still rejected at the 1% level (4.2411>4.1326). In this case, we identify an exuberant
episode from mid-November 1719 to mid-September 1720 in Figure 4b.
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In both cases, such an exuberant episode is closely related to the rapid growth and burst of the
famous South Sea Bubble. Although there are some differences regarding the origination and collapse285
dates for the two models as shown in Figure 4a and Figure 4b, the general conclusion still holds.
These results suggest evidence of exuberance in the South Sea Company share prices, which coincides
with the well-documented South Sea episode in history. Thus we provide some signs of exuberance
to support the famous South Sea episode in 1720 by applying the PSY to the daily South Sea share
prices between August 1719 and November 1720.290
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Figure 4: Date-stamping strategy of South Sea share prices between August 1719 and November 1720 (Julian dates)
based on different model formulations.
4.2.1. Other British share prices
It is well-known that the South Sea Bubble is related to the spectacular rise and fall in South
Sea stock prices. However, as discussed in Frehen et al. (2013), the South Sea Company does not
experience the largest price increase and several other major companies also experience significant
increases and falls during 1720. For example, the East India share prices increased over 100% and the295
Bank of England share prices surged by 60% before they fall back (Hoppit, 2002). The stock market
is, in fact, speculative in 1720 as suggested by Figure 1b and Figure 1c. A close inspection of Figure 1c
demonstrates that the several share prices are far more than doubled during 1720. Especially, share
prices of Royal African Company, Royal Exchange Assurance and London Assurance rise to more than
ten times higher than the initial prices at the peak. Carlos et al. (2006) also point out that the Royal300
African Company is more speculative than other joint stocks during the South Sea episode. On the
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other hand, the share of Bank of England is widely regarded as the least speculative stock among the
major joint-stock companies (Carlos & Neal, 2006).
We, therefore, test for explosiveness in stock prices for the other six major corporations in the
British market. Figure 5 displays the identified episodes suggested by the GSADF test based on the305
regression model formulation with/without an intercept for all eight companies considered in our study.
Several interesting results can be concluded from Figure 5. First, comparing Figure 5a with Figure 5b
shows the exclusion of the intercept in the model formulation has affected the asymptotic theory and
date-stamping strategy of the PSY approach. This is demonstrated by the fact that the exact timing
in the origination and bursting of these episodes are different under the two formulations. Second,310
the South Sea Company is the first one experiencing exuberance in the British market. As discussed
earlier, we can identify the potential collapse episode or the collapse and recovery episode in Figure 5a
under the assumption with an intercept. Hence, we focus on the date-stamping outcomes in Figure 5b
based upon the model specification without an intercept. As demonstrated in Figure 5b, the South Sea
Company experiences the first exuberant episode in the British market, and such an episode is closely315
followed by those of Million Bank and other companies. We also notice that the South Sea episode is
not the first one to burst and it lasts the longest period. This finding is not surprising due to the impact
of the South Sea episode and in line with Frehen et al. (2013), who conclude the South Sea Bubble
is not the first one to crash by graphically inspecting share prices alone. Third, several British share
prices exhibit exuberant episodes that last for a few months only as noted in Figure 5b (e.g., London320
Assurance, Million Bank, the Royal African Company, the Royal Exchange Assurance and South Sea
Company). Generally speaking, these results suggest that the British market is speculative on a more
general ground as the South Sea Company is not the only one experiencing explosive behaviour. There
are signs of exuberance in the British market in 1720 as presented in Figure 5b.
The date-stamping outcomes under two model specifications for the Bank of England, London325
Assurance, Million Bank, East India Company, the Royal African Company and the Royal Exchange
Assurance are provided in Figs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, respectively. We firstly present the results
for the Bank of England. It seems that there is evidence of exuberance in Bank of England share
prices as suggested by Figure 6. Under the assumption with an intercept in the regression model, the
null hypothesis of no explosive behaviour is rejected at the 1% level (3.7915>2.7313), indicating the330
presence of exuberance between May 1720 and June 1720. However, the null cannot be rejected at
the 10% level under the model without an intercept in the regression, suggesting no strong evidence
exuberance. Therefore the test results suggest a short-lived exuberant episode in the share price of
Bank of England under the model with an intercept only.
14
We find evidence of exuberance in London Assurance share prices under both models in Figure 7.335
The null of no explosive behaviour under the assumption with and without an intercept is rejected at
the 1% and 10% level, respectively. As shown in Figure 7a, we observe several short-lived exuberant
episodes and a collapse and recovery episode. The episodes identified from Figure 7a are quite different
from the one identified from Figure 7b. In particular, we observe an exuberant episode during mid-May
1720 and early September 1720 in Figure 7b.340
The date-stamping outcomes for Million Bank under two models are shown in Figure 8a and
Figure 8b. As can be seen from both figures, we observe strong evidence of exuberance in share prices.
The exuberant episode in the share price of Million Bank lasts much longer than those identified from
other companies. In fact, this exuberant episode lasts almost as long as the South Sea episode, which
is clearly shown in Figure 5b. This is a unique feature of the Million Bank episode.345
Figure 9 presents the date-stamping outcomes for share prices of East India Company. The null
hypothesis of no explosive behaviour is rejected at the 1% level under the assumption with an intercept,
where the GSADF statistic is 3.9619 and critical value is 2.7493. However, under the model without
an intercept, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 10% level as the test statistic is smaller
than the critical value (3.0021<3.1911). As can be seen from Figure 9a and Figure 9b, we only observe350
some evidence of a short-lived exuberant episode between May 1720 and July/August 1720.
Some interesting results are obtained from the Royal African Company. As presented in Figure 10a
and Figure 10b, we find evidence of exuberance in share prices of Royal African Company. The null
hypothesis of no explosive behaviour under the assumption with/without an intercept is rejected at
the 1% and 5% level, respectively. Our results seem to suggest exuberant episodes in share prices. It355
should be pointed out that Carlos et al. (2002) find no significant evidence to support the existence of
a bubble in the Royal African Company share prices during the South Sea episode.
The date-stamping outcomes for the Royal Exchange Assurance are provided in Figure 11. We
obtain similar date-stamping outcomes under two model specifications as shown in Figure 11a and
Figure 11b. We identify two exuberant episodes under both models: the first one during February360
1720 and the second one between May 1720 and August 1720. Under both models, we find evidence
of exuberance in share prices.
Overall, we present the date-stamping outcomes for six major British corporations, and the cor-
responding results suggest the presence of exuberance in these share prices. Such a finding indicates
that the British stock market during the South Sea episode in 1720 is exuberant. Among the six major365
share prices considered, we find evidence of a short-lived exuberant episode in share prices of Bank
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of England and East India Company. However, the evidence of experiencing an exuberant episode in
these two corporations is not as strong as the evidence obtained from other four corporations (e.g.,
London Assurance, Million Bank, Royal African Company and Royal Exchange Assurance). We find
significant evidence of exuberance in these four corporations especially when the intercept is excluded370
from the regression model. We believe that the South Sea episode does spillover to other share prices
as indicated by Figure 5b. This additional analysis also implies that South Sea Company is not the
only one that is experiencing a rapid rise and sudden crash in 1720.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we present some interesting results for historical stock prices in France and Britain375
during 1719-20. Many existing studies in the literature focus on testing some recent bubble episodes.
Instead, we look at the most remarkable historical events - the Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles
during 1719-20. The motivation of this study is to explore evidence of explosive behaviour in the
relevant share prices during these great episodes using the PSY of Phillips, Shi & Yu (2015) as these
historical episodes still draw attention to many people nowadays. Our study provides new insight into380
the Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles. First, depending on the regression model specifications, we
find evidence of exuberance in share prices of both Mississippi Company and South Sea Company.
Such a finding coincides with the well-known Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles in the history. This
is the first empirical study to investigate the Mississippi and South Sea episodes using the PSY in the
literature, which contributes to the novelty of our study. Second, we also find evidence of exuberance in385
share prices for the other six major British corporations. The South Sea Company is not the only one
that is experiencing an exuberant episode in the British market. Our results seem to agree that there
are signs of exuberant episodes during the first international stock market boom. Moreover, the timing
of these relationships is provided as some possible evidence of spillovers or contagion in exuberance
in the financial market more generally during this period. Our findings will be of interest not only390
to scholars who work on testing financial bubbles but also economic historians who are interested
in the rage of speculation in the Mississippi and South Sea share prices. Future work may consider
investigating these historical episodes using alternative approaches.
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(a) All eight companies under the assumption with an intercept in the regression model.
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(b) All eight companies under the assumption without an intercept in the regression
model.
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Figure 5: Date-stamping strategies of all eight companies based on the model formulation with/without an intercept.
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(b) Bank of England
under the model without an intercept
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Figure 6: Date-stamping strategy of the Bank of England share prices between August 1719 and December 1720 (Julian
dates) based on different model formulations.
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Figure 7: Date-stamping strategy of London Assurance share prices between December 1719 and December 1720 (Julian
dates) based on different model formulations.
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(a) Million Bank
under the model with an intercept
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(b) Million Bank
under the model without an intercept
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Figure 8: Date-stamping strategy of Million Bank share prices between August 1719 and December 1720 (Julian dates)
based on different model formulations.
(a) East India Company
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(b) East India Company
under the model without an intercept
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Figure 9: Date-stamping strategy of East India share prices between August 1719 and December 1720 (Julian dates)
based on different model formulations.
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(a) Royal African Company
under the model with an intercept
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(b) Royal African Company
under the model without an intercept
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Figure 10: Date-stamping strategy of Royal African share prices between August 1719 and December 1720 (Julian dates)
based on different model formulations.
(a) Royal Exchange Assurance
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(b) Royal Exchange Assurance
under the model without an intercept
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Figure 11: Date-stamping strategy of Royal Exchange Assurance share prices between December 1719 and December
1720 (Julian dates) based on different model formulations.
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